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Abstract 
In { 5} Pequeno and Buchsbaum presented a new default logic, the 
so-called Inconsistent Default Logic (IDL). which is based on Da 
Costa's paraconsistent logic { 3}, in which the Ex Falso rule 
t/> A -,t/J ~ 1/f does not hold. They argue that IDL is more appropriate 
to model conflicts between default rules than Reiter's original default 
logic. In this paper we present the Question Marked Logic (QML), 
which is a further development of IDL. We show that QML inherits 
the good behaviour of IDL on representing conflicts, and that in addi-
tion it can be used to model specificity between default rules in a 
very intuitive way. We also show that QML can be viewed as a 
generalisation of the meta-level architecture BMS for non-monotonic 
reasoning as presented in { 8, 9} 
1. Introduction 
In { 5} Pequeno and Buchsbaum argue that in default reasoning a dis-
tinction should be made between 'hard' and 'soft' inconsistencies. If t/> 
and -,q, are conflicting factual information data, then clearly t/J A -,I/> is a 
hard contradiction. But if we have that t/J is given as factual information, 
whereas ...,q, is a default assumption, then t/J "-,t/J is a soft contradic -
tion. Also if both <fJ and -i</J are conflicting default assumptions, then 
t/J A-.f/> is a soft contradiction. Soft contradictions should be treated dif-
ferently from hard ones. One of the most important differences is that the 
Ex Falso rule might be applicable for strong contradictions, but not for 
soft ones. The Ex Falso rule says that we can derive any arbitrary fcr-
mula l/f from the contradiction <fJ "-i</J, i.e. 
t The research of this author was partially supported by the ESPRIT Ill Basic Resacrcb 
Project No.6156 DRUMS 11 and ESPRIT III Basic Research Working Group No.8319 
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In classical logics this Ex Falso rule always holds. However, for mod-
elling default reasoning it is better to have a logic in which Ex Falso 
does not hold for the case where either l/J or -,tfJ in the conjunction 
q, A -,q, is a default assumption. Hence, to model default reasoning one 
would like to have a logic in which default assumptions are syntactically 
distinguishable from factual information, and in which the Ex Falso rule 
only applies to hard contradictions that contain only factual statements. 
In { 5} Pequeno and Buchsbaum introduced a new type of default logic, 
called the Inconsistent Default Logic (IDL), which is based on a para-
consistent logic instead of the classical logic that is used in Reiter's 
original default logic (see {7}). Paraconsistent logics are logics that lack 
the Ex Falso principle. Hence, in these logics it is not the case that from 
a contradiction 4> A -,tp follows any arbitrary statement lJf, i.e. 
4' A -,!p ::!;> lJf The two best-known paraconsistent formalisms are Da 
Costa's system { 3} and Belnap's four-valued logic { 1}. Although the un-
derlying semantics are quite different, these differences are not relevant 
in this paper. For a detailed comparison of different paraconsistent sys-
tems the reader is referred to { 6}. For the use of paraconsistent for-
malisms in knowledge representation see { 2}. 
In IDL paraconsistency is selectively applied. The language of IDL 
consists of two types of formulas; formulas with a question mark ( ~ ?) 
and without it ( tP ). The basic idea is that the question marked formulas 
denote default assumptions which are weaker statements than the fac-
tual statements without question marks. The paraconsistency in IDL is 
selective in the sense that the Ex Falso principle is only valid for ?-free 
formulae, but not for question marked formulae, i.e. </J? A -,<fJ? ~ lJf · 
Hence, a contradiction between default assumptions does not lead to an 
explosion of derivable formulas, whereas a contradiction between factual 
statements does lead to such an explosion. Pequeno and Buchsbaum 
show in their article that this difference can be used to solve the problem 
with anomalous extensions in Reiter's default logic that was pointed out 
by Morris in {4}. 
The logic IDL can also be viewed as a meta-level architecture for 
non-monotonic reasoning that has two levels: an object-level and a 
meta-level. At the object-level we reason about factual statements with-
out question marks, and at the meta-level we reason about default as-
sum~tions with question marks. The reasoning at the object-level is 
classical. and the reasoning at the meta-level is paraconsistent. Default 
rules in IDL have a question marked formula as conclusion, and question 
mark-free formulas as conditions of these rules. Given some factual in-
formation at the object-level the default rule asserts a default assump-
tion at the meta-level. 
The logic we introduce in this paper, the so-called Question Marked 
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Logic (QML) can be viewed as a generalisation of IDL. Instead of only 
one paraconsistent meta-level as is the case in IDL, the logic QML 
contains a hierarchy of meta-levels. In addition to formulae of the form 
<P? with one question mark QML also has formulae with arbitrary finite 
numbers of question marks, i.e. </J ?, <P ??, </J??? etc. We use the notation 
</Ji to indicate that t/J is followed by i question marks. The basic idea is 
that if i < j, then the statement ipi is stronger than <j)i in the sense that 
in QML <j)i implies <Pi but not vice versa. Analogous to IDL the Ex 
Falso rule does not hold for levels i with i larger than 0, i.e. 
q,; A.-.t/Ji -:y!:.'l/fi for i > O. l 
2. The Idea behind QML 
The central notion of the Question Marked Logic (QML) is the distinc-
tion of levels at which statements are made. A problem that may occur in 
ordinary default logic is the possibility of applying multiple default rules 
to infer a statement about a certain proposition. This may especially oc-
cur in taxonomic hierarchies, where some properties of the individuals 
may be cancelled and reintroduced. An example of this is the hierarchy of 
animals, birds and penguins, where an animal cannot fly by default, a bird 
can fly and a penguin cannot. 
In a situation as described above we would like the results of more 
specific default rules to cancel or block the results of less specific default 
rules. In order to do this we need to make a distinction among state-
ments and rules. This distinction is made by putting every statement at 
a certain level. These levels establish a hierarchy among the proposi-
tions. The inference of a statement is blocked by a contradicting state -
ment at a lower level, i.e. -,a4 blocks the inference of a5• If we infer 
something using a default rule the conclusion is at a level higher than the 
antecedent and the justifications. At the lowest level nothing is derived 
from a default rule. 
At the same time we would like to retain an element of paraconsis-
tency like in IDL. This means that contradictory statements inferred at 
the same level are allowed to coexist peacefully. So our system should 
be constructed in a way that it tolerates some inconsistencies, but that 
others are not allowed. 
The Question Marked Logic contains default rules of the form 
l In QML expressions of the form 41 ?1 /\ yt ?J with i ?! j are not well-defined, and hence 
they have no direct consequences. 
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where ai is the antecedent of the rule, /Ji+I the conclusion, and f3i and 
yi can be compared with the justification in Reiter's default rul~s_. The 
conclusion /Ji+l can be derived with this rule if a; is true, -i/3' ts not 
true. and neither -. r; nor -,yi+t is true. The usefulness of this subtle 
difference between ri and p; will be explained later. 
The application of a default rule brings the conclusion at one level 
higher than the antecedent and the justifications. The question mark hi-
erarchy plays two roles with regard to default rules. The first is that the 
application of a default rule to the conclusion of another default rule 
brings the second conclusion at a higher question mark level to indicate 
its default nature. Secondly. we can now establish a hierarchy among the 
default rules, such that the application of a more specific rule prevents 
the use of a more general rule. 
For a better understanding of what is and is not possible we discuss 
some examples. The diagrams show the derivability of both ai and 
-.. ai. The fact that a statement is inferred is indicated by a '+' sign. If 
the inference of a proposition is blocked, a ' - ' sign is placed in its column. 
A u indicates that nothing has been inferred about a statement. 
The first example is the standard Tweety example. All penguins are 
birds, penguins cannot fly by default and birds can fly by default. Because 
being a bird (B) is a more general concept than being a penguin (P), the 
default rule about birds flying ( F2) is placed at a higher level than the 
default rule about the non-flying (-.FI) of penguins. These two defaults 
can be expressed in QML as follows: 
Suppose now that we have inferred pt . With the default rule that pen-
guins do not fly we infer -.F2. Now that we inferred that Tweety does 
not fly at level 2, we do not want any contradicting conclusion to be in-
ferred from more general rules, i.e. at higher levels. The diagram pictures 
the resulting inference of propositions. 
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Question Mark Level i Fi -,Fi 
n + 
3 + 
2 + u 
1 u u 
0 u u 
What happens if we derive a contradiction at a certain level? An example 
of this is the Nixon diamond. Quakers are pacifists by default, republi -
cans are not pacifists by default. Nixon is both a quaker and a republican. 
Is he a pacifist or isn't he? These two defaults can be represented in 
QML as follows: 
Ql:P': 
p2 
Suppose at level 1 we have QI and R'. The default rule about the paci-
fism of Quakers and the default rule about the non-pacifism of 
Republicans lead to contradicting conclusions, because no rule is more 
specific than the other. This means that at level 2 both P1 and .P2 are 
inferred. Since there is no Ex Falso rule at levels i greater than 0, these 
conflicting conclusions do no lead to an inferential explosion, and we will 
see that both conclusions can be contained in one extension. Because 
truth at a certain level is propagated upwards to higher levels, both con-
clusions are also inferred at the levels above 2. 
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Question Mark Level i p; -J'i 
n + + 
3 + + 
2 + + 
1 u u 
0 u u 
3. The Logic Bn 
The base logic for QML is Bn. which is a multi-level logic2 .The logic Bn 
contains an arbitrary, finite number of levels. Basically, the logic Bn is 
simply a collection of the logics ;to, ;t1 ... :£.n . We will first define the 
language of Bn. After that we will give the semantics of 9n. 
The alphabet of Bn is formed of the following: 
1. A set of propositional constants sll.. 
2. A truth constant True 
3. The connectives -,, v, I\ and ~ 
4. Punctuation marks «' and ')' 
5. An indexed indication of the level 'i', with 0 ~ i ~ n 
To define the set of well-formed formulae in Bn, we first define an inter-
mediate set ell. <1> is the smallest set satisfying the following conditions: 
1. All propositional constants are members of cl> 
2. If 'fl, t/f e cl>, than -.4>. 4' v 'l/f and tf> A VI e <I> 
Now that we have defined the set cl>, we can define the set <i 
well-formed formulae. We define a sequence of languages 
L0 ••. Ln, where li is the language for the logic ;f i at level i. The lan-
guage li is defined as follows: 
1. If i/> e cl>, then q,; e li 
2. If i/>. 'l/f ell, then -.tf>, --.1/f, ( 'fl v V') and ( iJ> A V') e Li 
Implication q,; ~ 'l/f; is defined as ..,,p; ~ VI;. A formula i/> is a 
well-formed formu1a of Bn if and only if iJ> is a well-formed formuJa of one 
2 The logic B' is a 4-valued logic, whereas IDL is based on an adapted version of Da 
Costa's C,. paraconsistent logic. 
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of the logics f;f.i that Bn consists of. This definition in two stages of the 
set of well-formed formulae in Bn is to prevent the nesting of question 
marks and mixing up the languages of the different levels. We wish to 
exclude such formulae like for example 
Examples of formulae that are well-formed are 
(av-,f3)3 
The logic Bn consists of a finite number of logics ;£0 ••• ;£11 • Each of these 
logics has its own language £0 ... lJt. The semantics for sn is defined in 
tenns of the semantics of the levels. This semantics is a Belnap 
four-valued semantics for the logics ~1 to f;f.n. f;f.O is the only level tha~ 
has a classical semantics. Let WFF' denote the set of well-formed L' 
formulae. 
Definition 1. A/our-valued model .Mi for the logic 91, 1 ;S; i Sn is a junc-
tion from the set of welljormed. V 1ormf:llae to the fourtruth values {u, f, 
t, o}. In other words a model M' is an 9J-model if 
(i) 
(ii) 
i=O: Mi: WFFi ~{f, t} 
i ~ 1 : Mi : WFF; ~ fu .. J, t, o} 
For all formulae in WFF' the mapping agrees with the truth ta-
bles for Bn (see Figure 1) 
The following notation is used for well-formed Li -formulae 
and 
The '+' and ' -• signs are not part of the syntax of the formul~ ; , but are 
semantical symbols related to ' l==i' If both Mi li6it;+ and M1 li6i;-, then 
</I is undefined i.e. Mi( <P) = u. H, on the other hand, we have both 
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Mi F=;tfl+ and Mi t=;q,- then Mi(<J>)=o. 
The truthtables for Bn are the truthtables for Belnap's logic. These 
truthtables are a superset of the classical truth tables. Therefore we can 
use them for all levels, including the 0 level. The following truthtables 
are schemata with i ranging over 0, 1, ... , n. 
"'i I\ Vii u f t 0 "'iv Vii u f t 0 -,q,i 
u u f u f u u u t t u u 
f f f f f f u f t 0 f t 
t u f t 0 t t t t t t f 
0 f f 0 0 0 t 0 t 0 0 0 
Figure 1: nn Truthtables 
Definition 2. A Lm1ormula <P with 0 s ms n is a :tm-semantical conse-
quence of a set of Lm·formulae I written IF= m </>, if for all .:t:m-models 
Mm holds 
The semantic consequence relation of the compound logic Bn is com-
posed of the semantic consequence relations of the composing logics 
:£0 ... ;fn. 
Definition 3. A Bn formula <P is a Bn semantic consequence of a set of 
Bn formula L, written l: t=B"<P· if! there exists an m with 0 s m ~ n, 
such that <P is a !£m-semantic consequence of a subset of Lmjonnulae, 
say :Em, of I, i.e. 
I: t==B"<P (:::}There is an m such that :Em t=m<P• 
with Osmsn and Im !;;;;L. 
The closure in Bn is defined as follows: 
Definition 4. Let Th8• (S) denote the set of all formulae that are Bn con-
sequences of S, i.e. 
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If it is clear from the context, we usually omit the subscript Bn from 
Th8 •. 
In this paper we only give the semantic definition of Bn. For a proof 
system for each of the four-valued logics :£1, ••• , ;f,n the reader is re -
ferred to { 10 )3. 
4. Properties ofQML as a Default Logic 
Transitions between the different logics :£; and :£ J in Bn are strictly via 
default rules. We will define a QML default theory, a QML default rule 
and an extension of a QML theory. 
Definition 5 A QML default is of the form 
ai: 13;~ yi 
f3i+I 
The formulae ai, {3i, f3i+I and y; are welljormed formulae of Bn with 
0 ~ i ~ n. The formula a; is the antecedent, /3; the default condition, y; 
the proviso, and f3i+I the conclusion. 
IDL defaults are QML default rules in which i = 0. 
Definition 6. A QML theory is a pair (W, D). where W is a set of L0 
formulae and D a finite set of QML default rules. 
QML default rules can be viewed as a multiple meta-level generalisation 
of the idea behind the so-called heuristic rules in the meta-level architec-
ture BMS { 8, 9}. For example the default rule 
aD: /JO; y-0 
131 
can be roughly compared to the heuristic rule T(a)A-.T(-q) ~ PA(/3). 
This heuristic rule states that the default assumption PA(/J) can be de-
3 See in particular the proof system I- K in Section 2.4 of ( 10). The proof syslCf!! I-K is 
given for the three-valued Strong Kleene Logic, but Urquhart makes the observation that 
if one removes the rule q,, .,;1-K lfl from this system, then the resulting system is a proof 
system for Belnap's four-valued logic. 
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rived at the meta-level (= level 1) if at the object-level (= level 0) a is 
true and r is not false (i.e. r has either the semantic value u or t). 
Another feature of QML is upward reflection. It means that everything 
that is true at a level m must be true at higher levels. because a higher 
level represents a weaker notion of truth. If the strong version of a 
proposition is true, its weaker versions are certainly also true. This rule 
is a generalisation of the upward reflection in the meta-level architecture 
BMS for default reasoning described in { 8, 9}. The upward reflection is 
implemented by the following rule schema: 
,i.; .• 
'f' •• f all . . al 
-. -, or proposition symbols </J and 0 :S i < n 
</JI+! 
In this schema the default condition and the proviso are always true. The 
rule schema is included in D for every QML theory. In the sequel we will 
not mention the schema in D, but we will assume that it is contained in 
every D. If S; is a set of li-formulae, then we write Upw( S;) to denote 
the set of IJ+1-formulas that are generated by the upward reflection 
schema, i.e. 
An extension of a QML theory is defined as follows, following Reiter 
{7}. 
Definition 7. (Extension) Let ~ = (W, D) be a QML default theory. 
For any set of formulae S from the logic Bn let r(S) be the smallest set 
satisfying the following three properties 
(1) w ~r(s) 
(2) ThB.(r(S)) = f(S) 
( 3) For each default ai: {3i: yi e D, if ai er( S), 
/Ji+l 
-./Ji e S and -,yi, -,yi+1 e s 
then Bi+I E r(S), where 0 Si< n 
A set Q is an extension of .1., if! r( Q) = Q, i.e. Q is a fixed point off. 
Note that Q extensions do not always exist. This is a well-known prob-
lem in Reiter's default logic that also occurs in QML. The famous exam-
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pie of a Reiter default theory that has no extension is the default with 
the empty prerequisite (~}The analogon of this in QML is, for ex-
ample, the default ( ~:). i.e. the proviso violates the conclusion. This 
default does not have a Q extension in QML either. 
Upward reflection has the effect that -.yi+l ES implies -,yi ES. 
Hence, a QML default rule might as well be formulated as 
ai: p;; y;+1 
{3i+I 
We prefer the current format in order to preserve the property that IDL 
defaults are QML defaults with i = 0. 
The resulting extensions are different from the corresponding reiter 
extensions. The intuitive explanation for this is that in addition to 
internal consistency we take into account whether we can decide 
between the application of rules when defining a QML extension. In 
some situations different Reiter extensions are combined in a single 
QML extension. An example of this is the Nixon-diamond, as formulated 
earlier in Section 2. 
QI: PI: 
p2 
Rl: -,PI: 
-,P2 
Ifwe have W={QO, RO}, then the contradicting defaults about Nixon's 
pacifism lead to different extensions in Reiter default logic, but are incor-
porated into one extension in QML, namely Th({Q0 , RO, P 2, -.P2 }). 
The intuition behind this is that we cannot decide which rule talces prior -
ity. 
In other situations counter-intuitive Reiter extensions are eliminated 
in the corresponding QML situation. An example of this can be found in 
taxonomic hierarchies where all properties are modelled by default rules. 
An example is the following Tweety example: 
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W={P, P~B} 
D={B;. p:;} 
which has two extensions in Reiter default logic: 
E1 = Th({P, B, -.F}) 
£i = Th({P, B, F}) 
Whereas the corresponding specificity based QML theory 
W={po, po ~BO} 
D={PO:-,FO:, Bl:F1:} 
-,FI F1 
has only one extension 
Q= n({po, Bo, -,Fl }) 
Note that, if we took s = {po, BO, F1}' then r( S) = Th( {po' B0 }) ~ s' 
due to the fact that r(S) is the smallest set that satisfies the require-
ments (1)-(3) from Definition 7. The next application of r gives us the 
extension of this QML theory, i.e. f(f(S)) = Q. This QML theol)'. als? 
illustrates how specificity can be implemented in QML. Given the 1mph-
cation po~ BO in W, the first rule is more specific than the last one. 
Hence the last rule should be at a higher level than the first one. 
Note that we cannot obtain this result if we only allow IDL defaults, 
i.e. default rules in which i = 0. If we replace D for example by 
D'={PO:-,FO: BO:fO:} 
-,FI ' pl 
then 
In this extension we derive the conflicting conclusion -,FI A F1 , and not 
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just the preferred conclusion -,FI as we have in g 
We can solve these problems in IDL by changing the default rules from 
D' as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
The formula FO in the proviso of Rule 2 prevents the application of this 
rule, if Rule 1 is applied. This yields the desired extension 
Q =Th( {po, B0, -,F'1}). Suppose, however, that we have a third level of 
specificity about animals (A), that generally do not fly, e.g. we add the 
role 
(3) 
then this rule will be preferred over Rule 2, if we have W'= {AO, B0 }. 
Hence, we get Q'= Th({Ao, BO, -FI}), which is counter-intuitive be-
cause Rule 2 is more specific than Rule 3. The solution is to replace Rule 
3 by the following rule about animals: 
AO: -,FO: -,FO (4) 
-,FI 
In this case, Rules 2 and 4 will block each other given W, which results 
in multiple extensions: 
Q~=Th({AO, BO,-,FI}) 
Q'2 =Th({Ao, BO, FI}) 
Again this is counter-intuitive. Since Rule 2 is more specific than 4, the 
only intuitive extension is Q'2• The best way to ~olve this p_rob~em i_s to 
explicitly add the more specific cases as exceptions to the JUSUficat1ons 
of the rule about animals. Hence, even Rule 4 has to be replaced by the 
following more complicated rule: 
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Ao: -,FO "..,po "~o: -,FO 
-,FI 
(5) 
The corresponding specificity-based QML default theory would be as 
follows: 
Given W ', this would only yield the intuitive extension 
Q" =Th({ AO, BO, F2}). Hence, these examples show that QML is more 
appropriate than IDL to represent specificity-based reasoning. 
QML inherits from IDL the nice property that it solves the anomalous 
extension problem as described by Morris { 4}. An example is the follow-
ing theory about being a bird (B). being an animal (A). being able to fly 
(F) and having wings (W). 
W={W~F. B~A. B} 
D= {A: -,F A-,W B: w } 
-,F , w 
The extensions of this theory in Reiter default logic are 
£1 = Th({ B, A, W, F}) 
and 
~ = Th({B, A, ...,P, -,W}) 
Extension E2 is an anomalous extension, because it contains the 
strange conclusion that Tweety is wingless because he cannot fly. In 
QML this theory would be modelled as follows: 
W={W0 ~FO • .BO~AO, BO} 
D={A1: -J71: -,WI , BO: wo:} 
-J?2 w• 
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The only extension of this theory is 
As we see the anomalous extension is blocked by the presence of a hi-
erarchy among the default rules. Moreover, in this example the role of 
the proviso is essential. 
Situations with multiple extensions still exist in QML. The pattern for 
this is the presence of a combination of default rules whose conclusion is 
the contradiction of the proviso of another default rule. An example of 
this is the following pair of default rules: 
Ai: Bi; -.Ci 
Bi+I 
Ai: Ci; -,]Ji 
Ci+I 
In combination with a theory W = {Ao}, this leads to the extensions: 
and 
This pattern is the only one that leads to multiple extensions. The intu-
itive motivation for these multiple extensions is that we cannot decide 
which rule takes priority, but that we are sure that the two rules are mu-
tually exclusive. In other cases the difference in levels can take care cf 
blocking the application of a conflicting default. 
5. An Alternative Extension Definition 
The following theorem gives us an alternative definition of an extension: 
Theorem 1 Let T be a QML theory (W, D) with n the number of levels 
of default rules in D, then Q is an extension of T if! there are 
Qo, Q1, ••• , Qn such that: 
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(1) Q=QouQ1u ... uQn 
(2) Qo = Tho(W) 
(3) For O~i <n 
Qi+I = Th;+1(Cons(QJ) 
where (Cons( Qi})= 
ai· 13i· yi . . 
· . · e D and a 1 e QI, 
i+I f3l + 1 
f3 ..,pi E Qi, -qi E '4· -,yi + 1 ~Qi+ l 
where Thi is the deductive closure of a set of formulae in Bn at level i. 
Proof We denote U7=o~ with 0. We must prove that 0= r(Q). We 
do this by proving that f(Q)cO and Ocf(Q). Remark that each Q; 
is the set of those elements of Q that are statements at level i. 
To show that Ocf(Q), assume the contrary. Then there is a k such 
that Q.1:-i c f(Q) and Q;<i: f(Q). This implies that there are a, f3, 
and r such that p.1: e: fH2J and 
ak-1 · ak-1. yt-1 
.,., . eD 
w 
aH E Qk-1' -,{3k-I E Qk-1• -,y·H E Qk-1 and -,yt E Qk. Qk-1 C f(Q) 
implies that a·H E f(Q), and -,fJk-1 E Qk-1 implies that -./Jl-1 E Q, 
and -.yt-t E QH and -,yt e Qt implies -,yH, -.yt E Q. However, we 
have f3k E f(Q). This contradicts the third property of the f -operator as 
defined in Definition 7. 
To show that r{Q) c Q, we have to show that Q satisfies the condi-
tions for f(Q) The first two conditions are trivial. Since 
Qo = Tho(W), W c 0. Q is deductively closed, because every level i is 
deductively closed in Q;. Finally the conditions to apply a default rule are 
analogous with the only difference being the substitution of n for r(Q). 
Since r(Q) is defined as the smallest set satisfying its conditions, 
r(Q)~n. 
6. Establishing the Specificity Hierarchy 
As we mentioned earlier a conclusion from a general rule should be at a 
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higher level than a conclusion resulting from a specific rule. This way the 
specific rule will block the application of the general rule. To achieve this 
the ordering of the default rules should reflect the subset relation of the 
predicates that occur in the antecedents of these rules. For example, the 
rule that birds fly by default is more specific than the rule that animals do 
not fly by default, because being a bird implies being an animal. The idea 
is captured by the following constraint which every QML theory should 
satisfy: 
Definition 8. (Specificity constraint) Given a QML theory T = (W, D). 
The specificity constraint on T is, that if W F= 8• q,0 ~ vr° then for every 
pair of default rules 
if>k: xk; vk l/fm: mm; µm ED 
xk+I mm+I 
we have m >k. 
7. Conclusion 
We have presented the Question Marked Logic and showed that in 
some cases it yields more intuitive results than Reiter's original default 
logic and Pequeno and Buchsbaum's improvement of it, IDL. In particu-
lar, QML is more appropriate for modelling specificity among default 
rules than IDL. We also showed that it can be viewed as a generalisa-
tion of the meta-level architecture BMS for non-monotonic reasoning. 
Some possible applications may be found in legal practice and in reason-
ing about object systems. For a more .elaborate description of QML and 
its development the reader is referred to { 11 } . 
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